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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jimmy Moore appeals, asserting that the district court abused its discretion when it
granted the State’s I.R.E. 404(b) motion to present audio recordings from a related, but distinct
criminal case based on its conclusion that the probative value of those recordings was not
substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. As such, this Court should vacate his
conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Moore with filing a false affidavit in support of his motion for a
new trial on a domestic violence charge. (Aug. pp.1-2.)1 The affidavit in question was prepared
by an inmate who Mr. Moore had met while in prison – Ryan Tone – who alleged he had been
present on the night of the incident and had information that pointed to an alternative perpetrator.
(See generally Conf. Exh., pp.25-36.)2 Under cross-examination, Mr. Tone explained that some
of the details in his affidavit were erroneous, and he claimed he had been pressured to include
them by Mr. Moore.3 (E.g., Tr., p.311, L.6 - p.313, L.15, p.343, Ls.4-9.)
Mr. Moore denied that allegation – instead, he would later testify, he had provided the
affiant with a blank affidavit form. (Tr., p.457, L.7 - p.458, L.11.) He testified that he had
explained to Mr. Tone how to fill out the affidavit (“just like telling a story,” “write it in a
paragraph,” “just a short story about what you seen”), and told him it was important he was

1

A motion to augment the record with the Information has been filed contemporaneously with
this brief.
2
Citations to “Conf. Exh.” are to the electronic document “Conf.Exh-Moore” which contains all
the exhibits introduced during the trial and pretrial hearings.
3
Mr. Tone did not appear at the jury trial. Rather, over Mr. Moore’s objections, the prosecutors
were allowed to read his testimony from prior hearings. (See generally Tr.)
1

truthful in his account. (Tr., p.458, L12 - p.459, L.3.) He explained that Mr. Tone filled the
affidavit out on his own because he and Mr. Tone were housed on different tiers, and so, would
not have had the opportunity for the conversation Mr. Tone was describing.

(Tr., p.462,

L.15 - p.464, L.4.) He denied telling Mr. Tone what to put in the affidavit or pressuring him to
prepare the affidavit. (Tr., p.469, Ls.6-18.)
When he received the affidavit from Mr. Tone, Mr. Moore copied it by hand (with one
admitted alteration to the declaration of authenticity portion (see Tr., p.470, L.19 - p.471, L.14)),
and Mr. Tone signed, under notary, the copied affidavit.4 (Tr., p.466, Ls.1-17; Conf. Ex., p.10;
see Tr., p.334, Ls.5-14 (Mr. Tone admitting the copy Mr. Moore made was the same as his
original affidavit); Tr., p.336, Ls.3-12 (Mr. Tone admitting he signed the copy Mr. Moore had
made); see also Tr., p.431, Ls.7-23, p.440, Ls.8-19 (the prison paralegal testifying that he
verifies the person signing an affidavit to be the person to whom the affidavit is ascribed before
he will notarize the document); Conf. Exh. p.10.) Mr. Moore explained he submitted the copy
with his motion and sent the original to his attorney. (Tr., p.465, Ls.18-22.)
In preparation for trial the prosecutor gave notice of her intent to present evidence under
I.R.E. 404(b). (R., pp.63-64.)5 Specifically, she intended to present the audio recordings from
the officers’ body microphones and a 911 call which had been prepared in the underlying
criminal case. (See R., pp.52-61.) She asserted those recordings were necessary to show the
affidavit was, in fact, false. (R., p.58.) Mr. Moore conceded that the evidence was relevant, but
argued it should still be excluded on the prejudice prong of the analysis because the audio
recordings did more than present the relevant facts – they did so in a dramatic manner that was

4

Mr. Moore noted he created three copies, one which went to the district court, one which went
to the prosecutor, and one for his own records. (Tr., p.465, Ls.18-22.)
5
Citations to “R.” are to the electronic document “Appeal Amended Clerks Record.”
2

unnecessary in the case at bar, and so, the risk of undue prejudice (that the jury would convict
based on his prior actions) outweighed the probative value of those recordings in this case.
(R., p.185; Tr., p.26, Ls.14-21 (“It’s one of those that when you listen to it, it will stick with you
for a while . . . . I would not want that to be part of the record in this case and have the jury hear
that information when deciding the merits of this case.”).) The district court granted the State’s
motion to present that evidence, though it left open the possibility that it would limit the
presentation of that evidence during the trial. (Tr., p.29, Ls.1-6.)
Mr. Moore renewed his objection to all the recordings on the morning of trial. (Tr., p.58,
Ls.4-23.) For, example, he explained “It’s remarkable, the audio of my client’s arrest. My client
is animated. My client is profane. . . . And you can hear kind of just the struggle in the --”
(Tr., p.58, Ls.10-12.) As such, while “I understand the relevance of it,” defense counsel argued
it still “would tend to mislead, inflame or confuse the ultimate issues in this case and prejudice
my client’s right to a fair trial.” (Tr., p.58, Ls.17-21.)
The district court acknowledged “there is likely a danger of prejudice,” but also, the court
concluded, “[i]t’s extraordinarily probative on the issue of whether the affidavit is true” in
several respects. (Tr., p.59, Ls.14-20.) Therefore, it concluded there was not a risk of unfair
prejudice that would outweigh that probative value. (Tr., p.59, Ls.20-22.) However, it did
subsequently hold that the first twenty to thirty seconds on one of the recordings contained
inadmissible information and ordered the exhibit be started after that point.

(Tr., p.192,

L.18 - p.193, L.2; p.375, Ls.4-12.) The district court also ultimately precluded the State from
admitting one of the audios in its case-in-chief. (Tr., p.373, L.18 - p.374, 8; see also Tr., p.193,
Ls.3-6 (indicating, after the first officer’s recording, it gets cumulative); Tr., p.194, Ls.5-17
(noting that the audios contain a lot of profanity use by Mr. Moore, so it might cut off playing of

3

the second officer’s recording for that reason as well).) Mr. Moore renewed his prejudice
objection when the State proffered the remaining body microphone exhibit.6
Ls.16-20.)

The district court continued to overrule that objection.

(Tr., p.409,

(Tr., p.409, Ls.21-23.)

However, when giving the post-proof instructions, it included a limiting instruction with respect
to the “other acts” evidence. (Tr., p.497, Ls.8-20.)
The jury ultimately found Mr. Moore guilty as charged. (R., p.234.) Mr. Moore then
pled guilty to a persistent violator enhancement. (See Tr., p.540, Ls.14-18.) The district court
subsequently imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, consecutive to
Mr. Moore’s other sentence. (Tr., p.580, Ls.4-7.) Mr. Moore filed a notice of appeal timely
from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.238-44.)

6

When the State moved to admit the audio from the 911 call, Mr. Moore made a relevance
objection under I.R.E. 401, but did not renew his prejudice objection under I.R.E. 403. (See
Tr., p.362, Ls.15-18.) The district court overruled the relevance objection. (Tr., p.362, Ls.1920.)
4

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by granting the State’s motion to present evidence
under I.R.E. 404(b) by miscalculating how much probative value the audio recordings actually
had in this case, and therefore, by determining the risk of unfair prejudice created by did not
substantially outweigh that probative value.

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Granting The State’s Motion To Present Evidence
Under I.R.E. 404(B) By Miscalculating How Much Probative Value The Audio Recordings
Actually Had In This Case, And Therefore, By Determining The Risk Of Unfair Prejudice
Created By Did Not Substantially Outweigh That Probative Value

A.

Standard Of Review
The appellate courts use a two-tiered analysis when evaluating the district court’s

decision to admit evidence under I.R.E. 404(b). State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 229 (2008).
First, the court freely reviews the determination of whether the evidence is relevant. Id. Second,
it reviews the determination of whether the risk of undue prejudice substantially outweighs the
probative value for an abuse of discretion. Id. The district court abuses its discretion when:
(1) it fails to recognize the issue as one of discretion; (2) it acts beyond the outer bounds of its
discretion; (3) it acts inconsistently with the applicable legal standards, or (4) it reaches its
decision without exercising reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018).
Below, trial counsel conceded that the audio recordings were relevant, but maintained
that the risk of undue prejudice outweighed that probative value. (R., p.185; Tr., p.26, Ls.14-21.)
The district court did not reach its conclusion on the prejudice prong analysis in an exercise of
reason.

B.

The District Court’s Weighing Did Not Reflect An Exercise Of Reason Because It Gave
Too Much Weight To The Alleged Probative Value Of The Audio Recordings
The district court recognized that the audio recordings in this case contained the risk of

undue prejudice. For example, it ultimately precluded the State from presenting one of the
audios during its case-in-chief because of the amount of cursing it contained and that it was
probably cumulative of another exhibit. (Tr., p.193, Ls.3-6, p.194, Ls.5-17, p.373, L.18 - p.374,

6

L.8.) As defense counsel pointed out, the audio recordings that were presented to the jury were
similar to the ultimately-excluded recording. (See Tr., p.26, Ls.14-21.) Therefore, there was,
given the district court’s analysis, at least some risk of at least some unfair prejudice from the
audio recordings.
Thus, the question is whether that risk substantially outweighed the probative value of the
audio recordings. The district court concluded it did not because it concluded the recordings
were “extraordinarily probative” to prove the affidavit was false. (Tr., p.59, Ls.16-22.) This
represents an abuse of its discretion because the district court was overestimating how much
probative value the audio exhibits had. As a result, it failed to conduct the weighing analysis in
an exercise of reason.
The analysis of whether evidence should be admitted under I.R.E. 404(b) often turns on
what issues are in contention in the trial. See, e.g., State v. Sanchez, 161 Idaho 727, 732-33
(Ct. App. 2017); State v. Brummett, 150 Idaho 339, 342 (Ct. App. 2010) (quoting State v. Roach,
109 Idaho 973, 974-75 (Ct. App. 1985)). That the affidavit was factually inaccurate on some
points was not really in contention.7 Rather, the point in contention was whether Mr. Moore
knew or had reason to know the affidavit provided to him by Mr. Tone was false when he
submitted it in support of his motion for a new trial.

This is an important distinction to

appreciate because the audio exhibits do little to inform the jury about whether Mr. Tone’s
assertion of what he remembered witnessing was obviously mistaken. After all, it is not actually
uncommon for eyewitnesses to have recollections of events that are factually inaccurate or for

7

While Mr. Tone asserted that some of the details in his affidavit were factually inaccurate
(such as that he verified the time on his cellphone), he stood by several key points in his affidavit
– notably, that he was present on the night in question and he saw other people at the apartment –
despite rigorous questioning from both attorneys. (See, e.g., Tr., p.298, Ls.14-21, p.302,
Ls.19-21, p.327, Ls.14-21.)
7

them to have inaccurate memories of an event, particularly when that event is several years in the
past. See, e.g., 7 Jones on Evidence § 61:3 (7th ed.) (July 2019 update) (“Unfortunately, police
officers, attorneys, judges, and jurors lack knowledge of how memory works . . . . This lack of
knowledge about the nature of memory and eyewitness factors makes it difficult for them to
prevent eyewitness error and determine when it has occurred.”).8
For example, Mr. Tone alleged that he had not heard Mr. Moore curse at the officers.
(Conf. Exh., p.5.) He subsequently explained this was because he was not close enough to
actually hear what was being said. (Tr., p.283, Ls.3-10.) Therefore, the fact that the audio
exhibits reveal Mr. Moore actually did curse at the officers has little weight in evaluating
whether this assertion by Mr. Tone was accurate because both can be true at the same time. As
such, the audio exhibits have little relevance to the point at issue – whether Mr. Moore should
have reasonably believed Mr. Tone’s affidavit to be inaccurate.
As a result, the district court’s weighing of that evidence, which was based on giving
“extraordinary” weight to the probative value of that evidence because it showed what had
8

If judges, police officers, and attorneys struggle with identifying when eyewitness error has
occurred, see 7 Jones on Evidence § 61.3, that suggests the same would be true of a pro se
defendant who received an affidavit from another inmate, such that he might not be reasonably
expected to identify such error before presenting such an affidavit in support of his motion.
In this case, that conclusion would depend on the jury not believing Mr. Tone’s testimony
that Mr. Moore was present when he initially wrote the affidavit and was pressuring him to
include those details. (See, e.g., Tr., p.311, L.6 - p.313, L.15, p.343, Ls.4-9 (Mr. Tone’s
testimony in this regard).) There was a readily-apparent basis upon which the jurors could have
disbelieved Mr. Tone’s testimony in that regard – the fact that he and Mr. Moore were housed on
different tiers, and so, would not have had the opportunity for the sort of sit-down conversation
Mr. Tone was describing. (See, e.g., Tr., p.462, L.15 - p.464, L.4 (Mr. Moore also testifying that
he had given Mr. Tone a blank affidavit form, gave him general instructions as to how to fill it
out, and then, Mr. Tone had returned the completed affidavit to him at a future point).)
Still, though, the relevant point to the analysis of the audio exhibits under I.R.E. 404(b) is
that the audio exhibits offer only a little insight into whether Mr. Tone’s affidavit was an
accurate description of what he, Mr. Tone, remembered witnessing. Since the audios were not
terribly relevant to this critical analysis, that still reveals the abuse of discretion in the district
court’s weighing of the probative value against the acknowledged risk of undue prejudice.
8

actually happened on the night in question, was mistaken. (See Tr., p.59, Ls.16-22.) Since the
district court miscalculated the proper weight of the probative value, its evaluation of whether
the prejudice substantially outweighed the probate value does not represent an exercise of reason.
That means it abused its discretion in that regard.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Moore respectfully requests this Court vacate his conviction and remand this case for
a new trial.
DATED this 23rd day of December, 2019.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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